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On December 7, 1982, Charles Brooks, Jr. was executed by lethal
injection in Huntsville, Texas.' Brooks was both the first person to die
by state administered injection and the first black man to be executed
since the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the death penalty in 1976.2
A jury had sentenced Brooks and an accomplice, Woody Loudres,
to death for the kidnap-murder of an auto mechanic. 3 The prosecution
failed to prove which of the two defendants did the actual killing.4
Loudres won an appeal and then obtained a forty-year sentence in a
plea-bargain. 5 Although originally convicted of the same crime as
Brooks, on the same evidence, Loudres will not die for his offense. He
will be eligible for parole in six years.6 Brooks is dead.
Prior to Brooks' death, his prosecutor joined those seeking to stay
his execution since Loudres had received only a forty-year term and no
one knew which defendant had fired the fatal shot. 7 The courts which
reviewed Brooks' sentence dismissed the argument that the disparate
treatment was unconstitutional.8 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit stated:
The contention is that the two sentences [of Brooks and Loudres] are not
proportional and that there is no rational basis for the difference in their
sentences. It is well-settled that the State may favor with clemency a per-
* Professor of Law, King Hall, University of California, Davis; J.D., Indiana University,
1965; A.B., Indiana University, 1961.
** I wish to acknowledge and thank my research assistant, now attorney, Nancy McGann
for her superb and invaluable aid in helping me prepare and complete this article.
I The Sacramento Bee, Dec. 7, 1982.
2 The Los Angeles Times, Dec. 6, 1982.
3 Los Angeles Daily Journal, Dec. 8, 1982.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 The Los Angeles Times, supra note 2.
7 Id.
8 Brooks v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 586, 588 (5th Cir. 1982).
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son who confesses his guilt. Moreover, to exact review of a prior sentence
each time another person involved in the same crime or a person involved
in another similar crime is sentenced would require literally endless review
unless the state ceased to prosecute and obtain convictions in capital cases.
The constitution does not require retrospective review of a sentence im-
posed four years earlier. 9
Contrast the judicial review of Brooks' capital sentence to that of
Robert Harris. Harris kidnapped two sixteen-year-old boys and drove
them to a secluded area where he killed them.10 After the killings, he
fired an extra bullet into one boy's head."I He then ate hamburgers the
boys had been eating when he came upon them. 12 Using the boys' car,
he robbed a bank and was apprehended shortly thereafter. 13 Harris
confessed several times to the killings.
14
The jury convicted Harris and sentenced him to death. 15 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court upheld his conviction and sentence. 16 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, stayed
Harris' execution.' 7 It ruled that Harris' case must be compared to sim-
ilar cases to determine whether Harris' death sentence was dispropor-
tionate to the crime.'8 Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals thus held that "proportionality review" of death sentences
was constitutionally required.
These cases illustrate radical differences in the ways in which appel-
late courts interpret the constitutional requisites of capital judicial re-
view. Disparate and inconsistent treatment is the result of these
differing judicial interpretations. The death penalty which is constitu-
tional when imposed rationally, consistently, and objectively, claimed
Brooks, 19 passed over Loudres, and hovers uncertainly over Harris.
These cases therefore raise an important question: what forms ofjudicial
review are constitutionally required in capital cases? More specifically,
are there particular forms of judicial review that may reduce arbitrari-
ness in death sentences and, if so, does the Constitution require states to
institute these reviews?
9 Id.
10 People v. Harris, 28 Cal. 3d 935, 944, 623 P.2d 240, 243-44, 171 Cal. Rptr. 679, 683
(1981), reo'd sub nom. Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
1425 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1983) (No. 82-1095).
11 Id.
12 Id. at 945, 623 P.2d at 244, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
13 Id. at 944-45, 623 P.2d at 244, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
14 Id. at 945, 623 P.2d at 244, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 683-84.
15 Id. at 947, 623 P.2d at 244, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
16 Id.
17 Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1425 (U.S. Mar.
21, 1983) (No. 82-1095).
18 Id. at 1196.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 20-30.
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This Article argues that rigorous appellate review, including pro-
portionality review, is constitutionally required. Part II of the Article
states the current constitutional requirements for the imposition of a
death sentence, and develops the principles essential to them. Part III
discusses the constitutional status of judicial review of death sentences
and concludes that forms of judicial review which reduce arbitrariness
are constitutionally mandated. Part IV discusses problems in judicial
review of death sentences and describes constitutionally adequate sys-
tems of capital sentence review.
II. THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF CAPITAL SENTENCING LAW
Death sentences violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments'
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment when imposed
under a sentencing system which creates a substantial risk of an arbi-
trary, discriminatory, or capricious decision.2 0 If a judge or jury may
impose death without guidelines for selecting that sentence, there is a
substantial risk of arbitrariness, discrimination, or caprice.2' For these
reasons, the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia22 struck
down a capital sentencing system which allowed unguided imposition of
the death penalty.
Most state legislatures responded to Furman by requiring the death
penalty for certain crimes or by establishing capital case sentencing
guidelines for guided sentencer discretion. The guided discretion
schemes involved statutorily defined aggravating circumstances, one of
which had to be found by a sentencer before the death penalty could be
imposed.
A. MANDATORY SENTENCING SCHEMES
In Woodson v. North Carolina23 and Roberts v. Louziana,24 the Court
overturned state statutes which required a death sentence for any first
degree murder. In Woodson, the plurality noted that in the past, the
majority of first-degree murder cases had resulted in sentences short of
death 25 and that therefore, a "mandatory death penalty statute for first-
degree murder departs markedly from contemporary standards respect-
ing the imposition of the punishment of death. '26 In addition to a risk
that such sentences might not comport with community mores, there
20 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)(per curiam).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
24 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
25 428 U.S. at 292-99, 303 (1976).
26 Id. at 301.
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was a significant likelihood that juries might refuse to convict a defend-
ant of first-degree murder. Such jury nullification would escape any ap-
pellate review. 27 The Court in Woodson also stated that a death sentence
is qualitatively different from any term of imprisonment because it is
final and irrevocable. 28 The eighth amendment's proscription of cruel
and unusual punishment "requires consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular
offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of in-
flicting the penalty of death."'29 Mandatory death sentencing reflects
neither contemporary standards nor permits individualization. It is
therefore unconstitutional, according to the plurality.
30
B. GUIDED DISCRETION SCHEMES
In Gregg v. Georgia,3 1 Proffilt v. Florida,32 and Jurek v. Texas, 33 the
Court upheld guided discretion capital sentencing systems. In Gregg,
Georgia's capital sentencing system included bifurcated trials, a require-
ment that the sentencer specifically find one of ten aggravating circum-
stances beyond a reasonable doubt, and a provision which allowed the
sentencer to weigh mitigating evidence against aggravating evidence.
34
Georgia also provided for expedited state supreme court review of capi-
tal convictions.35 On review, the Georgia Supreme Court was required
to consider not only errors assigned on appeal, but also whether the
death sentence had been imposed arbitrarily or disproportionately.
3 6
According to the Gregg plurality, each of the foregoing devices min-
imized the risk of arbitrariness in a capital sentencing system.3 7 The
Court emphasized that Georgia's sentencing elements could collectively
reduce arbitrariness to acceptable constitutional levels. It is therefore
important to determine what role, if any, each individual element plays
in a constitutional scheme of arbitrariness risk reduction.
27 Id. at 303.
28 Id. at 305.
29 Id. at 304.
30 Id. at 304-05.
31 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
32 428 U.S. 242 (1976). For a discussion of Profti, see infra note 37.
33 428 U.S. 262 (1976). For a discussion ofJurek, see infra note 37.
34 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164-66.
35 Id. at 167-68.
36 Id. at 198.
37 Id. at 206-07. In Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (1976), the Court considered guided discretion capital sentencing systems which were
different from Georgia's. Nonetheless, construing each of them to require a bifurcated trial,
sentencer discretion under guidelines, an opportunity to present mitigating evidence, and
appellate review, the Court upheld these systems as well.
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C. PROCEDURES REDUCING THE RISK OF ARBITRARY SENTENCING
. Bifurcated trial
Bifurcated trials, in which guilt and penalty are tried separately,
reduce arbitrary sentences in two ways. First, they permit a jury to con-
sider evidence relevant to guilt apart from evidence relevant to sen-
tence.38 A jury can therefore focus on sentencing guidelines without the
possible confusion and prejudice introduced by guilt considerations.
39
Second, the jury can hear mitigating evidence, necessary for individual-
ized sentences, 40 which might be inadmissible in a unitary trial.
2. Specific objective standards for imposing a death sentence
Statutory sentencing guidelines reduce the likelihood of arbitrary
sentencing. The requirement that a sentencer expressly find a statutory
aggravating factor before imposing a death sentence limits the risk of
arbitrariness. 4 I Nonetheless, arbitrariness is not completely eliminated
from the system. A sentencer could, for example, return a death sen-
tence on the basis of a nonstatutory aggravating factor or on an irrele-
vant consideration. Mandatory appellate review can detect the
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty in cases for which sentences
are unusual. Furthermore, properly focused appellate review can cor-
rect other kinds of arbitrariness4 2 and is, therefore, an additional safe-
guard against arbitrariness or disproportionality in sentencing.
43
3. Dimensions of capital appellate review
In approving appellate and proportionality review, the Gregg plu-
rality discussed the appellate reviews statutorily mandated in Georgia.
The first is simply further scrutiny of the death sentence to determine
first, whether the evidence indicates that it was imposed arbitrarily, and
second, whether the evidence supports the finding of an aggravating cir-
cumstance. 44 Such review limits sentencer arbitrariness.
Another type of appellate review approved of in Gregg was a com-
parative review of previous cases to determine whether the death pen-
alty generally had been imposed in cases similar to the case under
review. 45 This is known as proportionality review.46 If a death sentence
38 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190-92.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 191.
41 Id. at 192-95.
42 See infra text accompanying notes 122-46.
43 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198, 204-06.
44 Id. at 204.
45 Id. at 204-06.
46 This review is also referred to as "comparative excessiveness review." Baldus, Pulaski,
[Vol. 74
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was unusual for a specific set of circumstances, it would be considered
disproportionate.
4 7
In Gregg, six Justices emphasized the importance of appellate re-
view as a means of minimizing arbitrariness in capital sentencing.
4 8
The plurality and concurring opinions reviewed the work of the Georgia
Supreme Court and found that it had effectively vacated unusual or
aberrant capital sentences. The Gregg plurality consequently concluded:
The provision for appellate review in the Georgia capital-sentencing
system serves as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty. In particular, the proportionality review substantially elim-
inates the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of
an aberrant jury. If a time comes when juries generally do not impose the
death sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the appellate review pro-
cedures assure that no defendant convicted under such circumstances will
suffer a sentence of death.
49
Similarly, the concurring Justices took the view that "[i]f the Geor-
gia Supreme Court properly performs the task assigned to it under the
Georgia statutes, death sentences imposed for discriminatory reasons or
wantonly or freakishly for any given category of crime will be set
aside."
50
In sum, according to a majority of the Justices, appellate review
guards against arbitrariness and caprice by ensuring both that a capital
sentence has a rational basis, supported by the record, and that the sen-
tence is consistent with sentences in similar cases.
5 '
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF DEATH SENTENCES
A. CONSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY REGARDING JUDICIAL REVIEW
While Gregg held that the elements of the Georgia system were suf-
ficient to establish a constitutionally satisfactory capital sentencing
scheme, it did not hold that any particular element was constitutionally
indispensable.52 Whether the Court will hold that any particular fom of
Woodworth & Kyle, Zdenti5ing Comparatively Excessive Sentences of Death: A Quantitative Approach,
33 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1980).
47 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 205-06. For example, in Georgia, armed robbery was a capital of-
fense. In Gregg, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that capital sentences were rarely
imposed for armed robbery and vacated Gregg's capital sentences for armed robbery. Gregg
v. State, 210 S.E.2d 659, 667, 233 Ga. 117, 127-28 (1974).
48 428 U.S. 198, 204-06 (Stewart, Stevens, and Powell, JJ., for the plurality); id. at 211-12,
222-24 (White, J., Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
49 Id. at 206.
50 Id. at 224 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
st See supra notes 48-50.
52 The Gregg plurality view is equivocal regarding the necessary elements of a constitu-
tional capital sentencing system. In its view, possibly any system which minimizes the risk of
1983]
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capital appellate review is constitutionally required, and, specifically,
whether proportionality review is required remains uncertain.
5 3
The Court's approval of the very different Texas capital sentencing
system injurek creates additional uncertainty about the constitutional
status of appellate review of capital sentences. Unlike the Georgia stat-
ute,54 Texas did not statutorily require appellate review of capital cases.
It had no provision for, nor a demonstrated court practice of, propor-
tionality review. 55 In approving the Texas capital sentencing system on
its face, theJurek plurality simply noted that "[b]y providing prompt
judicial review of the jury's decision in a court with statewide jurisdic-
arbitrariness and permits individualized capital sentencing is consitutional. The Georgia,
Florida, and Texas systems examined in Gregg, Proffitt, andJurek were construed to do so on
their face and were therefore approved. However, other systems, not having all four elements
emphasized in these cases, might also minimize the risk of arbitrariness and therefore be con-
stitutional. Bifurcated capital trials, sentencer discretion focused on objective guidelines, op-
portunities to present mitigating evidence, and appellate and proportionality review are
together sufficient, but may not be individually necessary conditions for constitutional capital
sentencing systems.
One federal court has held that proportionality review is constitutionally required. Har-
ris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. grantedon this issue, 103 S. Ct. 1425 (U.S.
Mar. 21, 1983) (No. 82-1095). Another federal court has held that proportionality review is
not required. Brooks v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 586, 588 (5th Cir. 1982).
53 In both Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976), the pluralities noted that proportionality review was an additional safeguard ensuring
nonarbitrary capital sentencing, but did not expressly hold that it was constitutionally re-
quired.
"Where the sentencing authority is required to specify the factors it relied upon in reach-
ing its decision, the further safeguard of meaningful appellate review is available to ensure
that death sentences are not imposed capricously or in a freakish manner." Gregg, 428 U.S. at
195.
"In addition, the review function of the Supreme Court of Georgia affords additional
assurance that the concerns that prompted our decision in Furman are not present to any
significant degree in the Georgia procedure applied here." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207.
Moreover, to the extent that any risk to the contrary exists, it is minimizied by
Florida's appellate review system, under which the evidence of the aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances is reviewed and reweighed by the Supreme Court of Florida "to
determine independently whether the imposition of the ultimate penalty is war-
ranted." .. .The Supreme Court of Florida, like that of Georgia, has not hesitated to
vacate a death sentence when it has determined that the sentence should not have been
imposed. Indeed, it has vacated 8 of the 21 death sentences that it has reviewed to date.
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 253 (citations omitted).
54 Also to be contrasted tojurek is Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). In its capital
sentencing system, Florida statutorily provided for automatic appellate capital sentence re-
view, but did not further specify the form that such review should take. However, the Florida
Supreme Court did conduct proportionality review:
[Tihe Supreme Court of Florida, like its Georgia counterpart, considers its function to be
to "[guarantee] that the [aggravating and mitigating] reasons present in one case will
reach a similar result to that under similar circumstances in another case. . . .If a de-
fendant is sentenced to die, this Court can review that case in light of the other decisions
and determine whether or not the punishment is too great."
Id. at 251 (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973)).
55 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
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tion, Texas has provided a means to promote the evenhanded, rational,
and consistent application of death sentences under law."
56
This may be construed in three ways. First, noting the emphasis
placed on appellate and proportionality review in Gregg5 7 and in Prof-
fill, 58 the language can be read as presuming that Texas would achieve
in practice the type of review that Florida and Georgia had achieved by
statute. It was statutorily possible, and there was nothing to suggest that
the Texas reviewing court would not do so.
A second reading ofJurek is that the Court found the definition of
capital murder in the Texas death penalty statute to be so narrow that
the further safeguard of proportionality review was unnecessary. 59 This
reading implies that the Constitution may require proportionality re-
view as an essential safeguard in looser capital sentencing schemes.
Finally, because the Texas statute mandated neither appellate re-
view focused on arbitrariness nor proportionality review, the language
can be read as holding that neither form of appellate review is required
by the Constitution.
The constitutional status of capital appellate review is of immediate
concern. 6° Some states, like Georgia, require relatively elaborate capital
case review-including proportionality review. Others provide neither
for any specific review nor for proportionality review as a part of their
capital sentencing systems.6 1 Many of these states, however, have ex-
56 Id. at 276.
57 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198, 204-06; see supra text accompanying notes 44-50.
58 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251, 253; see supra note 53.
59jurek, 428 U.S. at 270-71.
60 The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari on this issue. Pulley v. Harris,
103 S. Ct. 1425 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1983) (No. 82-1095); see supra note 52.
61 Thirty-two states provide for proportionality review either by case law, State v. Rich-
mond, 114 Ariz. 186, 560 P.2d 41 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 976 (1977); Collins v. State, 261
Ark. 195, 548 S.W.2d 106, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977); State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1973); People v. Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d 508, 404 N.E.2d 181 (1980); Brewer v. State, - Ind. -,
417 N.E.2d 889 (1981); State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 250 N.W.2d 881, cert. denied, 434 U.S.
878 (1977); State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978), or by
statute, ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(b) (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46b(b)(West 1983);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(g)(2)(1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(b) (Supp. 1982);
IDAHO CODE § 19-2827(c)(1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 532.075(3)(Supp. 1982); LA. CODE CRIM.
PRO. ANN. art. 905.9 (West Supp. 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 414(e)(1982); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-105 (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.014(e)(Vernon 1979); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-310 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.03 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 177.055(c), (d) (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VII) (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-20A-4(c) (Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (Supp. 1981); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2929.05(a) (Baldwin Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.13 (West
Supp. 1982); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (h)(3) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
25(c) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-27A-12 to -13 (1979);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-205(4) (1982); VA. CODE § 17.110.1C (1982); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.95.130 (Supp. 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-103(d) (1983).
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pressed a willingness to incorporate specific reviews should they be re-
quired.62 One state court interpreted Jurek to say that the required
appellate review assurance is merely that "the death penalty will be ap-
plied in a reasonably consistent manner," 6 3 and that no particular way
of fulfilling this assurance is mandated. Different courts, therefore, con-
duct different kinds of judicial review in capital cases and perform it
with considerably varying degrees of care and rigor.64 Thus, from state
to state, appellate procedural protections provided for capital felons
vary substantially.
62 See, e.g., State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 196, 560 P.2d 41, 51 (1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 915 (1977); Collins v. State, 261 Ark. 195, 210-19, 548 S.W.2d 106, 115-19, cert. denied,
434 U.S. 878 (1977); People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 182, 599 P.2d 587, 611, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 281, 304 (1979); Bell v. State, 360 So. 2d 1206, 1214-15 (Miss. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 950 (1979); State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 563-64, 250 N.W.2d 881, 890, cert. denied,
434 U.S. 878 (1977); Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, - Pa. -, -, 454 A.2d 937, 960-61
(1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2444 (1983); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 482, 248
S.E.2d 135, 151 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
63 Ferson, 25 Cal. 3d at 182, 599 P.2d at 610, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
64 Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEO. L. J. 97 (1979):
[A]ppellate review has not lived up to maximum expectations in [Georgia, Texas and
Florida].
First, the appellate courts in all three states have rarely held death sentences invalid
on their merits. The Georgia and Texas courts have held death sentences invalid in only
two and one percent of the cases reviewed. Although the Florida court has reduced
death sentences in twenty-three percent of the cases reviewed, in all but one of those
cases the trial judge had ignored a jury recommendation of leniency. When the trial
judge and the jury have agreed on the death penalty, the Florida court has been no more
willing to overturn this decision than have the Texas and Georgia appellate courts. Al-
though this is not conclusive, it suggests an absence of rigorous review.
Second, the appellate review process has not resulted in appellate opinions that pro-
vide an effective basis for the encouragement of proper and consistent sentencing prac-
tices. The Texas court, because of the nature of the review undertaken, has not
addressed the propriety of death sentences under a comparative analysis or through a
balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors. Even insofar as it addresses the "dan-
gerousness" of capital murder defendants, emphasized in question two of the Texas pro-
cedure, the court's opinions provide little useful guidance in evaluating the type of
showing required to make death the appropriate penalty.
Although the Georgia appellate procedure suggests that case law developed under it
might be more useful, in practice this has not proven true. The court has at least superfi-
cially engaged in a comparative analysis of the case before it with other, purportedly
similar, cases and has considered whether particular death sentences were imposed under
the influence of passion or prejudice. But the opinions contain few discussions precise
enough to serve as useful guidelines for trial courts. Although the court has taken care to
ensure that at least one aggravating circumstance is established in each case, the flex-
ibility of the statute's enumerated aggravating circumstances means that this is of little
actual value. The court's discussions ignore opportunities to compel or encourage either
careful scrutiny of potentially mitigating circumstances or the process by which aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances might be compared.
The results of review under the Florida scheme are very similar, and the appellate
decisions are, if anything, less useful for present purposes than those of the Georgia court.
The breadth and imprecision of the statutory aggravating circumstances has minimized
the need for careful development of criteria and the Florida court has not undertaken
more than is demanded.
Id at 159.
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B. BOTH RIGOROUS APPELLATE REVIEW AND PROPORTIONALITY
REVIEW ARE FAVORED BY THE SUPREME COURT
Constitutional principles and Supreme Court practice indicate that
both rigorous appellate review and proportionality review are constitu-
tionally required in cases in which the death sentence is imposed.6 5 To-
gether, they are the only systematic means of ensuring that capital
sentences reflect contemporary mores and minimize the risk of arbitrary
sentencing.
The Supreme Court has taken note of the necessity of rigorous and
proportional review by engaging in both kinds of review itself in capital
cases. Although the Supreme Court's death penalty decisions are com-
plex and depend up on different rationales, the Court has evolved a
coherent body of capital sentencing law, summarized by the following
principles: 6
6
(1) The cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment
has no fixed meaning. Its content must be determined by reference to cur-
rent societal norms. Therefore, capital sentences must reflect these contem-
porary societal norms.
67
(2) A capital sentence may not be imposed for an arbitrary reason, but
must be based on a principled, objective reason.6
(3) Capital sentencing systems must, viewed as a whole, minimize the risk
of arbitrariness.
69
(4) Because each individual is unique and because death is an irrevocable
punishment, the eighth amendment requires individualized sentencing
65 The issue is now before the Supreme Court in Pulley v. Harris, cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
1425 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1983) (No. 82-1095).
66 Some commentators think that the Court has shifted rationales in the death penalty
cases and that the latest cases disclose the governing rationales. See, e.g., Hertz & Weisberg, In
Mitigation of the Penaly ofDeath: Locktt . Ohio and the Capital Defendants'Rights to Consideration of
Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAL. L. REv. 317 (1981). In fact, the Court has evolved a set of
related principles, each of which remains important, though all of which may not be germane
to every case which it reviews. Fundamental issues in capital sentencing law, however, may
call all of these principles into play, and they should be used in concert, and interpreted
harmoniously, to resolve such issues.
67 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 274-79 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 332 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 382-84
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 409 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 429-30 (Powell, J., dis-
senting); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958)(plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
68 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251-53
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 303 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335
(1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam).
69 "Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so
grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion
must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion).
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which punishes capital defendants in accordance with their just deserts. 70
(5) Similarly, a capitally convicted defendant may introduce, in his sen-
tencing hearing, any evidence relevant to mitigation of his offenses.
71
Rigorous appellate and proportionality review of capital sentences are
necessary to ensure the application of these principles.
l. Proportionality review and rigorous appellate review of capital cases are
implicit in the concept of cruel and unusual punishment
The Supreme Court's capital sentencing decisions are bottomed on
the eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punish-
ments.72 In Furman, a majority of the Court noted that the cruel and
unusual clause had no fixed content. 73 Instead, its meaning is defined by
reference to current norms of American society.74 Imposition of a death
sentence which contravenes societal norms is unconstitutional.
Several of the plurality decisions in the death penalty cases-a total
of eight Justices-have acknowledged the constitutional importance of
the principle that capital sentencing must reflect contemporary stan-
dards of decency. 75 As stated in Woodson, "It is now well established that
the Eighth Amendment draws much of its meaning from 'the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' "76
Because there is no universal principle that determines what pun-
ishment is appropriate for a given offense or offender, the appropriate
punishment is relative to the society and time in which it is imposed.
Therefore, the appropriate degree of punishment can only be deter-
mined by comparing the offense and the offender to similar cases and
criminals.
With non-capital punishments, a more severe punishment for one
offender than another is commonly accepted, even in similar circum-
stances. The infinite gradations of guilt and the limits of human capac-
ity to judge cause us to overlook differential treatment of apparently
similar offenders. As the relative severity of punishment increases, how-
ever, it becomes more difficult to overlook sentencing disparities. Death
is the most severe of all punishments. The Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged that there is a profound and immeasurable gap between a death
70 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333-34 (plurality opin-
ion); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (plurality opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at
303-05 (plurality opinion).
71 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plu-
rality opinion).




76 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
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sentence and a life sentence. 77 Fairness to any capitally sentenced felon,
therefore, requires an assessment of the relative propriety of the sen-
tence. The only way to determine whether a death sentence is fair for a
given offense and a given offender is to compare his offense and his cul-
pability with that of others.
In addition to proportionality review, the eighth amendment re-
quires vigorous appellate review to ensure that the decisions of individ-
ual juries have reflected societal norms. In accordance with this
principle, the Court in both Woodson and Roberts struck down a scheme
which required the death sentence for all first degree murders. The
Court also held that such a mandatory sentence departed from contem-
porary standards of decency.78 The Court also found mandatory sen-
tencing schemes unconstitutional because they do not allow the
sentencer to express his or her actual sentiment, and therefore do not
allow sentencing to reflect contemporary standards. 79 Because values
continually change and because so many factors are significant in deci-
sions regarding the appropriateness of the death penalty for an individ-
ual, neither courts nor legislatures are capable of detailing in advance
exactly who should die or why. 80 Only factfinders8* can, for they alone
77 "IT]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long. . . . [T]here is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Woodson, 428
U.S. at 305; see also Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. In Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980),
the Court noted that challenges to the excessiveness of particular sentences have rarely been
successful in non-capital cases.
78 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 288, 301; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976).
79 Still further evidence of the incompatibility of mandatory death penalties with con-
temporary values is provided by the results of jury sentencing under discretionary stat-
utes. . . . The actions of sentencing juries suggest that under contemporary standards of
decency death is viewed as an inappropriate punishment for a substantial portion of
convicted first degree murderers.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 295-96; see also Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333-35.
80 Legislatures, as representatives of the people, may establish factors they feel should
trigger consideration of a death sentence for an offender. Courts may discern from the infre-
quency of death sentences for particular offenses or offenders that the community does not
feel that death is an appropriate penalty in such cases. Nonetheless, neither legislatures nor
courts can keep pace with the changing pulse of the community's sense of decency.
In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the Court explicitly recognized that
neither legislatures nor courts were capable of pre-defining who should live and who should
die:
Those who have come to grips with the hard task of actually attempting to draft means
of channeling capital sentencing discretion have confirmed the lesson taught by the his-
tory recounted above. To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homi-
cides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these
characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing
authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability.
Id. at 204.
For a court to attempt to catalog the appropriate factors in.this elusive area could inhibit
rather than expand the scope of consideration, for no list of circumstances would ever be
really complete. The infinite variety of cases and facets to each case would make general
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confront and weigh the specific aggravating and mitigating factors in
particular cases.
The Court and its members have repeatedly recognized the crucial
role that capital case juries play in determining contemporary standards
of decency. In Witherspoon v. Illinois ,82 the Court stated that jury sen-
tencing was important in capital cases in order "to maintain a link be-
tween contemporary community values and the penal system-a link
without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect
'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."1'8 3 The Gregg plurality stated that the "jury. . . is a significant
and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so di-
rectly involved [in the imposition of the death sentence]. ' '84 In Coker v.
Georgia ,85 the plurality said, "it is thus important to look to the sentenc-
ing decisions that juries have made in the course of assessing whether
capital punishment is an appropriate penalty for the crime being
tried."8 6
Still, a single jury may not accurately reflect dominant community
sentiment. Jury venires are designed to be cross-sectionally representa-
tive of the community. Nonetheless, voir dire and peremptory and
cause challenges can skew a jury's cross-sectional character.8 7 In addi-
tion, even a jury which is cross-sectionally representative of the local
population is not necessarily attitudinally representative of the popula-
tion of a state taken as a whole. Therefore, while the jury role is essen-
tial to ensure expression of present and developing community
sentiment, there is a risk that individual juries may not reflect that
sentiment.88
standards either meaningless "boiler-plate" or a statement of the obvious that no jury
would need.
Id at 208; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181-82 (1976); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291;
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968).
81 Some states, such as Florida, mandate advisory juries on sentencing and require judi-
cial imposition of capital sentences. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 249 (1976); see Gillers,
Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 101-19 app. (1980)(state by state listing of whether
judge or jury sentences).
82 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
83 Id at 519 n.15 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
84 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181.
85 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
86 Id at 596.
87 "Even the 12-man jury cannot insure representation of every distinct voice in the com-
munity, particularly given the use of the peremptory challenge." Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 102 (1970).
88 The same is true when the judge acts as sole factfinder. In the leading study of the
American jury, jurors were found to disagree with judges in 24.6% of a sample of 3576 crimi-
nal trials. KALVEN AND ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 56 (1966).
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2. Only judicial review can circumscribe potential arbitran'ness in current
capital sentencing
The second and third principles of capital sentencing law are that
death sentences must be imposed for principled, objective reasons and
that capital sentencing systems, as a whole, must minimize the risk of
arbitrary sentencing. If a given system produces arbitrary results, and a
procedural mechanism exists that can correct those arbitrary results, the
procedural mechanism is constitutionally required.89
The fourth and fifth principles of capital sentencing law call for
individualized sentencing and unlimited sentencer consideration of miti-
gating evidence. As explained below, unless checked in some way, sen-
tencer discretion to accord mercy may also increase the risk of
arbitrariness in capital sentencing.
Lockett v. Ohio90 and Eddings v. Oklahoma9 ' extended Woodson's indi-
vidualized sentencing requirement. In Lockett, Ohio's capital sentencing
statute required the sentencing judge to impose a death penalty if one of
seven specified aggravating circumstances had been found.92 If, how-
ever, the judge determined that one of three statutory mitigating cir-
cumstances had been established, he had discretion not to impose a
death sentence. 93 Ohio's statute prevented the sentencer from giving in-
dependent weight to mitigating factors other than the statutory factors.
Ohio's system limited not only the sentencer's discretion to impose a
death sentence, as Furman and Gregg required, but also the sentencer's
discretion to impose a life sentence. This latter restriction was held un-
constitutional. As stated by the plurality,
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all
but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering as a
mitigatingfactor any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death. . . . [A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all
capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the
89 The greater the possibilities of error at the trial level, the greater the capacity necessary
for the appellate process to detect and correct error.
90 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
91 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
92 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 611-12 app.
93 Id at 593-94. The statutory mitigating factors were: 1) that the victim induced or
facilitated the offense; 2) that the defendant was under duress, coercion, or strong provoca-
tion; 3) that the offense was a product of defendant's psychosis or mental deficiency short of
insanity. Id at 607. Therefore, while the sentencing judge could consider any mitigating
aspect of the offense or the offender, a death sentence was nonetheless required unless the
mitigating evidence established one of the three factors. Id. at 608. For example, if a defend-
ant had been an aider and abettor in a felony-robbery that resulted in a homicide, a death
sentence would be imposed unless it could be shown, for example, that the defendant aided
and abetted because of duress.
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defendent's character or record and the circumstances of the offense prof-
fered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed
in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.
94
Although a decision to impose death must be based on rational statu-
tory aggravating circumstances, constitutional respect for the individual
requires individualized sentencing and full consideration of any mitigat-
ing factor. 95 The Constitution thus requires guided sentencer discretion
to impose death and unlimited discretion to grant mercy and return a
life sentence.
9 6
Requiring specific aggravating factors while leaving mitigating fac-
tors open-ended creates an asymmetry in capital sentencing law and ap-
pears to contradict Furman's nonarbitrariness principle. Furman and the
Gregg series of cases held that a capital sentencing system which permit-
ted unguided sentencer discretion was arbitrary and therefore unconstitu-
tional. Lockett, by allowing the sentencer to accord mitigating evidence
any weight it desired, effectively held that unguided sentencer discretion
was constitutionally required. If unguided discretion regarding aggra-
vating circumstances produces arbitrary results, unguided discretion re-
garding mitigating circumstances will produce equally arbitrary results.
Lockett has apparently returned the law to the state in which it was
before Furman, and it appears that, once again, we may expect arbitrary
capital sentencing.
97
Equivalently circumstanced capital defendants should be punished
94 Id at 604-05 (emphasis in original).
95 Woodson v. North Cariolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325, 333-34 (1976).
96 In Gregg, the Court recognized that sentencer mercy did not violate the Constitution.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199, 203. Lockett allows a capital defendant to introduce all the migitating
evidence he or she may have, and permits the sentencer to accord such evidence any weight
he or she wishes. Lockett thus removes legal restrictions on the evidence that a sentencer may
consider in determining whether to return a life sentence.
97 Indeed, this was the view taken by Justices White and Rehnquist in Lockett:
The Court has now completed its about-face since Furman . Georgia .... By requir-
ing as a matter of constitutional law that sentencing authorities be permitted to consider
and in their discretion to act upon any and all mitigating circumstances the Court per-
mits them to refuse to impose the death penalty no matter what the circumstances of the
crime. This invites a return to thepre-Furman days when the death penalty was generally
reserved for those very few for whom society has least consideration.
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 623 (White, J., concurring in part).
If a defendant as a matter of constitutional law is to be permitted to offer as evi-
dence in the sentencing hearing any fact, however bizarre, which he wishes, even though
the most sympathetically disposed trial judge could conceive no basis upon which the
jury might take it into account in imposing a sentence, the new constitutional doctrine
will not eliminate arbitrariness or freakishness in the imposition of sentences, but will
codify and instutitionalize it. By encouraging defendants in capital cases, and presuma-
bly sentencing judges and juries, to take into consideration anything under the sun as a
'mitigating circumstance,' it will not guide sentencing discretion but will totally unleash
it.
Id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons:
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equally. If they are not, and the life sentence is not an isolated grant of
mercy, the death sentence is arbitrarily imposed and is therefore uncon-
stitutional.98 The amount of capital sentencer discretion required under
Lockett, however, is so great that sentencers may easily treat equivalently
circumstanced capital defendants unequally. When dissimilar sentenc-
ing of similar defendants is frequent, a capital system is constitutuion-
ally arbitrary. 99 Since the Constitution requires that a sentencer have
Super Due Processfor Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1153-55 (1980); Gillers, supra note 81, at
26-31. For a comprehensive treatment of Lockett, see Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 66.
It may be argued that Lockett does not reintroduce arbitrariness into capital sentencing.
As long as death sentences are imposed only for principled reasons, the argument runs, they
will not be arbitrary. Nonetheless, if, as Lockett permits, death sentences are not imposed even
when aggravating circumstances are present, it may become impossible to distinguish cases in
which death is imposed from cases in which it is not. Intercase arbitrariness results when
defendants who should be treated equally are not so treated.
There is a radical inconsistency between the Furman and Gregg line of cases and Lockett if
a sentencer may impose a life sentence, rather than a death sentence, for any reason. May a
sentencer, for example, return a life sentence based on the race of the capital defendant or
victim, or based on the locale in which the crime was committed? Such reasons are unprinci-
pled and would be held unconsitutional grounds for the imposition of a death sentence. In
addition, such sentencing rationales also should be unconstitutional as a basis for mercy. Of
course, the capital defendant receiving a life sentence in mercy has no such complaint. A
defendant capitally sentenced under similar circumstances, however, has a claim of unequal
treatment based on a denial of the constitutionally guaranteed equal protection.
There are at least two definitions of the word "arbitrary" as used in constitutional law.
It can mean either "without any reason" or "without any legitimate reason." For example,
governmental decisions based on racial, religious or ethnic discrimination are considered arbi-
trary in constitutional law. They are "arbitrary" because they are based on illegal considera-
tions and not because they are "without reason."
Lockett, if read consistently with Furman and Gregg, assumes that a sentencer's unguided
discretionary decision to impose a life sentence will be based either on legitimate mitigating
factors or will be "without reason," or an act of grace. Locket! does not contemplate sentencer
mercy based on unlawful or discriminatory reasons. However, because a sentencer is not
required to justify a life sentence as it must justify a death sentence, Lockett allows constitu-
tionally objectionable, arbitrary sentencing. Unless there is some mechanism to offset this
possibility, Lockett generates, or at least reopens, the equal treatment problems addressed by
Furman. Since the Constitution requires that a sentencer have unguided discretion to give a
life sentence, rigorous judicial review, including proportionality review, is necessary to check
the arbitrariness this discretion may produce.
98 Since the proportionality requirement on review is intended to prevent caprice in the
decision to inflict the penalty, the isolated decision of a jury to afford mercy does not
render unconstitutional death sentences imposed on defendants who were sentenced
under a system that does not create a substantial risk of arbitrariness or caprice.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203 (emphasis added).
99 The following example illustrates the point. Assume there are 100 robbery-murder
capital eligible defendants with essentially equivalent overall culpability. Of these, 90 receive
a death penalty after aggravating factors are found by the sentencer. The remaining 10 get a
life sentence for no apparent reason, which may be interpreted as a grant of mercy. In this
situation, no unconstitutional arbitrariness is shown because the typical punishment for the
offense is death.
If the proportions are reversed, however, the death sentences are constitutionally arbi-
trary. It is the frequency of grants of mercy (or life sentences) which is relevant to the issue of
arbitrariness, and not merely the existence of such grants. As knowledge of the frequency of
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unguided discretion to give a life sentence, the only corrective device to
check the possible unequal treatment this discretion may produce is rig-
orous proportionality review. Only proportionality review reveals
whether a given death sentence is consistent with a principled pattern of
capital sentencing in similar cases.
3. Equal protection requires comparative review of capital sentences
According to equal protection doctrine, if a state classification im-
pinges on a fundamental right, it must be justified by a compelling state
interest. 20 If the state cannot demonstrate such interest, the classifica-
tion will fall.101 Although the Court has not so held, it is axiomatic that
no right is more fundamental than the right to life.10 2 A capital sentenc-
ing system which results in differential treatment of similarly situated
capital felons has effectively classified similar felons differently with re-
spect to their rights to life. Consequently, an equal protection analysis
of this problem is appropriate.
The Court has held that the penological interests of deterrence and
retribution justify the principled application of the death penalty.
10 3
These may seem to be compelling state interests, justifying differential
state treatment of capital felons. But neither deterrence nor retribution
can justify a capital sentencing system which results in different
sentences for similarly situated capital defendants. Nonetheless, because
individualized sentencing is constitutionally required, it may be argued
that differential treatment of similar capital defendants is the inevitable
result of the system. Given constitutional and human constraints, there
is no way to perfect the system. It could further be argued that the fact
that some defendants are underpenalized does not demonstrate that
similar capital defendants who also deserve to die should not receive the
death penalty or that the state has discriminated against the latter if
they do. Sentencer mercy, as the argument runs, does not offend the
Constitution. 104
life sentences for similar offenses and offenders is critical, comparative review of cases is
essential.
100 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (rights of voting and travel); Kramer v. Union
Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (rights of association
and voting); cf Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel); Griffin v. Illi-
nois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to appellate review).
101 See cases cited supra note 100.
102 Although not stated in these terms, this is the import of the major death penalty deci-
sions: Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982); Loekett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
103 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-87 (plurality opinion).
104 Id at 203 (plurality opinion).
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These arguments are correct when applied to isolated cases, for the
Constitution requires only that the decision to impose the death penalty
be principled. 05 There is a tipping point, however, at which these argu-
ments lose their validity. Where capital sentences cannot be rationally
distinguished from a significant number of cases where the result was a
life sentence, more is present than the irremediable failure of an imper-
fect human system. When this occurs, the capital sentencing system has
become constitutionally arbitrary. Further, where mercy becomes the
norm for specific crimes and defendants, there is no justification for an
isolated capital sentence. At this point, which is determinable only by
comparative review, the state's interests in executing the capitally sen-
tenced criminal fail. As his fundamental right to life would then be
taken without compelling justification, his execution would violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Even where a state has a compelling interest to justify infringing on
a fundamental right, it must still show that the means it has chosen to
effect its interest is necessary 06 and is the least restrictive alternative.
Therefore, a state must adopt means which minimize the possibility that
defendants will be wrongly deprived of their right to life. Since the ba-
sic issue is whether a state's capital sentencing system differentially clas-
sifies similar defendants, a state must devise some means of ensuring
proportional sentencing. Comparative review, since it is explicitly di-
rected to this issue, is the least restrictive means of making this
determination.
In some states, there is another kind of sentencing classification
which denies capital defendants equal protection. California, for exam-
ple, has a system of mandatory comparative review of non-capital felony
sentences to ensure that similarly situated defendants are sentenced
alike.10 7 California, however, does not provide an equivalent compara-
tive review for capital felons. In effect, it classifies felons on the basis of
capital or non-capital conviction, according greater procedural protec-
tions to non-capital felons than to capital felons.
The disparity in treatment may be even greater than this statement
suggests. In California, most non-capital felons are subject to determi-
nate sentences which mandate a sentence within a narrow range of
years. 08 When a state provides disparate sentence review to such felons,
105 Id.
106 See supra note 100.
107 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1170(0 (supp. 1982); see infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
108 For most offenses, the California Penal Code prescribes three terms, a lower, a middle,
and an upper term, depending, respectively, on whether the crime was mitigated, average, or
aggravated. For example, the punishment for rape is three, six, or eight years. CAL. PEN.
CODE § 264 (West Supp. 1983). Robbery is punishable by a term of two, three, or five years.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 213 (West Supp. 1983). For any felony without a prescribed punishment,
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it protects a liberty interest amounting to a few years. The protection of
a small liberty does not, in and of itself, violate the Constitution. None-
theless, where a state does not provide an equivalent protection to capi-
tal felons, it prefers a non-capital felon's liberty interest of a few years to
a capital felon's life interest. There is neither a compelling nor even a
rational reason for a state to do this. 10 9
In protecting the reliability and fairness of non-capital sentences
while failing to do so for capital sentences, a state reverses constitutional
values. Because of their irrevocability and severity, the Constitution re-
quires greater reliability and fairness for capital sentences than for non-
capital sentences.11 0 Consequently, as a matter of equal protection, any
state providing for comparative review of non-capital sentences must
provide such review for capital sentences.
. United States Supreme Court practice indicates the effectiveness of both
rigorous appellate and proportionality review
The Supreme Court, when called upon to review capital sentences,
has engaged in both rigorous appellate review and proportionality re-
view. This militates strongly in favor of adoption of the two types of
review by the states. A good example of this is Godfrey v. Georgia."'
Godfrey and his wife had a heated argument. She left home and filed
for a divorce. Godfrey made reconciliation efforts, but his wife, appar-
ently supported by her mother, refused. After a telephone argument
during which his wife reasserted her desire for a divorce, Godfrey took
his shotgun and walked to his mother-in-law's trailer, where his wife was
staying. He shot both his wife and mother-in-law, killing them
instantly.
The jury sentenced Godfrey to death for both killings, finding the
statutory aggravating circumstance that each killing "was outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman."1 1 2 The Georgia Supreme
Court had previously interpreted these words to require a finding that
the murderer had a depraved mind which led him to torture or seriously
the punishment is either 16 months, two years, or three years in state prison. CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 18 (West Supp. 1983).
109 A state might argue that its procedures for determining whether the death penalty
should be applied are designed to prevent error at least as much as disparate sentence review.
This argument would be more convincing where non-capital felons received indeterminate
sentences. Where the sentence is mandatory within a range, however, and a higher than
average sentence must be specifically justified, the argument fails. Sentencing in the latter
system is subject to narrow constraints at least equal to those called for in capital sentencing.
110 Woodron, 428 U.S. at 305.
111 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
112 Id at 426.
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physically abuse a victim before death.113 Even though Godfrey's
crimes did not involve torture or physical abuse, the Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed his death sentences."
4
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding the aggravat-
ing circumstance vague as applied. 15 The Court implicitly criticized
the Georgia Supreme Court for failing to construe the "outrageously
vile" aggravating circumstance narrowly and consistently enough to
give clear guidance to juries and to provide a basis for making "ration-
ally reviewable the process of imposing a sentence of death."11 6 This
imports a strong obligation on the part of reviewing courts to do
whatever they can to make death sentencing procedures and sentences
strictly rational, objective and reviewable.
The Court also suggested that the Georgia Supreme Court had not
truly reviewed the evidence to determine whether it supported a finding
of an aggravating circumstance. 1 7 It thus failed in its obligation to con-
duct an independent review of the evidence. The Godfrey plurality also
suggested that the Georgia court had not conducted a genuine propor-
tionality review.' 1 8 Had it done so, it would have found that defendants
committing crimes similar to Godfrey's had not been sentenced to
death. The Godfrey plurality conducted a generalized comparative re-
view by finding that there was no principled way to distinguish God-
frey's case from the many murder cases in which no death penalty was
imposed. 119
113 Id at 431-32.
114 243 Ga. 302, 253 S.E.2d 710 (1979).
115 Id at 428-29. "There is nothing in these few words, standing alone, that implies any
inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence. A person of
ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder as 'outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible and inhuman."' Id
11
6 Id at 428.
117 Id at 432.
118 Id at 431-33.
119 Id at 433. In assessing the constitutionality of the death penalty in various cases, the
Court has characteristically conducted a comparative review to determine whether the death
sentence comports with contemporary values. In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), in
which the issue was whether a death sentence was an excessive punishment for the rape of an
adult woman, the court canvassed state capital statutes and jury capital sentences. That
evidence, it concluded, weighed "heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a
suitable penalty for raping an adult woman." Id at 596.
The Court conducted a similar comparative review in Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct.
3368 (1982), in which it concluded that death was an excessive sentence for an aider and
abettor in a felony-murder when the defendant was neither present at the scene nor shown to
have an intent to kill. Because it so clearly demonstrates the Court's approach, its treatment
of jury sentencing as evidence supporting its conclusion is worth quoting in full:
The evidence is overwhelming that American juries have repudiated imposition of the
death penalty for crimes such as petitioner's. First, according to the petitioner, a search
of all reported appellate court decisions since 1954 in cases where a defendant was exe-
cuted for homicide shows that of the 362 executions, in 339 the person executed person-
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Godfrey implies that rigorous judicial review, including proportion-
ality review, is required to ensure the constitutional imposition of death
sentences. Capital sentencing schemes must provide a "meaningful ba-
sis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is im-
posed from the many cases in which it is not. 1 20 Without stringent
appellate review and comparative proportionality review, it is not possi-
ble to determine whether a death sentence imposed in a particular case
is in fact the usual punishment imposed throughout the jurisdiction for
offenses of similar seriousness committed by comparable defendants.
2 1
5. The experience and practice of state supreme courts show that appellate and
proportionality review can and do detect arbitragr death sentences
The guided discretion statutes which the Supreme Court held con-
stitutional on their face were relatively new statutes. Consequently, in
considering the capital sentencing systems in Gregg, Profitt, and jurek,
the Court had little information regarding the application of the stat-
utes at either the trial or appellate level. The Court said only that the
statutes appeared to provide adequate safeguards against arbitrariness.
These decisions, however, sent a clear message to the states that the
ally committed a homicidal assault. In 2 cases the person executed had another person
commit the homicide for him, and in 16 cases the facts were not reported in sufficient
detail to determine whether the person executed committed the homicide. The survey
revealed only 6 cases out of 362 where a nontriggerman felony murderer was exe-
cuted ...
That juries have rejected the death penalty in cases such as this one where the de-
fendant did not commit the homicide, was not present when the killing took place, and
did not participate in a plot or scheme to murder is also shown by petitioner's survey of
the nation's death-row population. As of October 1, 1981, there were 796 inmates under
sentences of death for homicide. Of the 739 for whom sufficient data are available, only
41 did not participate in the fatal assault on the victim. Of the 40 among the 41 for
whom sufficient information was available, only 16 were not physically present when the
fatal assault was committed. These 16 prisoners included only 3, including petitioner,
who were sentenced to die absent a finding that they hired or solicited someone else to
kill the victim or participated in a scheme designed to kill the victim. The figures for
Florida are similar. Forty-five felony murderers are currently on death row. The Florida
Supreme Court either found or affirmed a trial court or jury finding that the defendant
intended life to be taken in 36 cases. In eight cases the courts made no finding with
respect to intent, but the defendant was the triggerman in each case. In only one case-
Enmund's-there was no finding of an intent to kill and the defendant was not the
triggerman.
Id. at 3375-76 (footnotes omitted).
120 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972)(White, J., concurring)).
121 At least 31 of the 33 states which allow the death penalty call for proportionality re-
view. This may be good evidence that such review is deemed an essential safeguard against
arbitrary death sentencing. See supra note 61. Since many of the states may have adopted
proportionality review in response to the Gregg series of decisions, the adoption may reflect the
considered judgment of states regarding safeguards against arbitrariness. Many may have
assumed that proportionality review was constitutionally required. In any event, virtually
every death penalty state interpreted the Gregg series of cases to require proportionality
review.
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approved systems should be applied to reduce the risk of arbitrariness.
The procedures necessary to accomplish that goal were not at issue
before the Court. Without accumulated experience as to how state sys-
tems were actually applied, the Court could not effectively mandate spe-
cific forms of capital judicial review. Now, however, there has been
considerable experience with the applicability of guided discretion sys-
tems and with the character of capital appellate review, and the Court is
now in a position to assess the constitutionality of specific forms of judi-
cial review. The sentence reversals of state courts, detecting capital sen-
tencing arbitrariness, are good evidence of continuing capital sentencing
impropriety and the capacity of appellate review to correct it.
States, by statute, and state supreme courts have developed the fol-
lowing appellate review practices to reduce capital sentencing arbitrari-
ness in guided discretion systems:
a. Statewide appellate review. To ensure both the development and
application of consistent procedural and substantive capital sentencing
rules, a single court with statewide authority must review all capital
sentences with a view toward applying uniform rules.12 2 Comparative
review of capital cases is also implicit in the idea of mandatory single
court review. When a single court reviews all capital sentences, it ac-
cumulates a view of what is occurring under a state's capital sentencing
system and may detect and correct deviant sentencing.
b. Review for procedural regularity. Perhaps a majority of the death
sentences that are reversed are overturned because of a procedural irreg-
ularity. 123 Given that a life is at stake in a capital case, reviewing courts
are understandably more willing to reverse a capital case for procedural
error than other criminal cases. A liberal policy of procedural reversal is
required to ensure sentencing regularity and consistency.
12 4
122 The Supreme Court has indicated that this is an important protection. Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976).
123 Although the conclusion is intuitive, it is supported by empirical evidence. For exam-
ple, of the 23 death sentence appeals decided, the California Supreme Court has upheld only
two. All of the reversals have been for various procedural errors, but none have been based
on disproportionality or excessiveness.
The scholarly literature leaves the same impression:
[Tihe Georgia Supreme Court has been quite willing to invalidate death sentences for
procedural errors in the sentencing process. This practice suggests a sensitivity to those
procedural problems that affect the proper application of the death penalty. A compari-
son of these actions with the low rate of substantive reversals suggests another possibility:
the court is using procedural defects to justify the reversal of death sentences that it finds
offensive for unarticulated but more "substantive" reasons.
Dix, supra note 64, at 118; see also Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Proportionality Review of Death
Sentences. An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Baldus].
124 There are, however, procedural means of ensuring rational capital sentencing and ra-
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c. Waiver of ordzar rules of appellate review. Usually, appellate
courts reviewing criminal appeals exclude consideration of errors not
noted at trial but raised on appeal.12 5 Because of the gravity and irrevo-
cability of a death sentence, even a small risk of error is intolerable.'
26
Consequently, in capital appeals, some reviewing courts waive rules pre-
cluding review of such errors.1
27
d. Narrowing constructions. Only an appellate court of statewide ju-
risdiction can provide the necessary narrowing of vague statutory terms
defining aggravating circumstances. For example, some states provide
that a death sentence may be imposed where a killing was "heinous,
atrocious, and cruel."' 12 8 If left to sentencer interpretation without fur-
ther definition, there is a strong likelihood that different sentencers will
ascribe greatly varying meanings to such terms, leading to arbitrary and
inconsistent results. The phrase needs a narrowing construction, which
only an appellate court can satisfactorily supply, to ensure at least rela-
tively uniform application throughout the jurisdiction.
There is a significant relationship between the appellate functions
of narrowly defining broad terms, conducting proportionality review,
and determining contemporary mores regarding the imposition of the
tional capital review. For example, courts have not demanded that sentencers be guided in
considering and weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Sentencers lack struc-
ture with which to examine such factors. In addition, in the absence of a statute, courts have
not required sentencers to state their reasons for the sentence imposed. This may result in less
responsible judgments.
125 For example, defense counsel's failure to object to prosecutorial or judicial misconduct
is usually deemed a waiver of the error. See, e.g., B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE § 747-49 (1978). For the general rule respecting appeals, see 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error
§ 1220 (1958).
126 See supra notes 20-30, 90-94 and accompanying text.
127 Death is clearly a different kind of punishment from any other that may be imposed,
and [Idaho Code] § 19-2827 mandates that we examine not only the sentence but the
procedure followed in imposing that sentence regardless of whether an appeal is even
taken. This indicates to us that we may not ignore unchallenged errors. Moreover, the
gravity of a sentence of death and the infrequency with which it is imposed outweighs
any rationale that might be proposed to justify refusal to consider errors not objected to
below.
State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 410-11, 631 P.2d 187, 192-93 (1981). Some other jurisdictions
follow similar rules to ensure comprehensive review of death sentences. See, e.g., State v.
Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 438, 383
A.2d 174, 179-80 (1978); State v. Ceja, 115 Ariz. 413, 415, 565 P.2d 1274, 1276, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 975 (1977); State v. Martin, 423 Iowa 1323, 1327, 55 N.W.2d 258, 260-61 (1952).
128 See People v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 797, 647 P.2d 76, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982)
(California statute permitting the death penalty for murders "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity," declared unconstitutionally vague); cf. Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (plurality opinion) (plurality declared that a Georgia statute
permitting imposition of death penalty for murder "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the vic-
tim," was interpreted in a broad an vague fashion by the Georgia Supreme Court, thus violat-
ing the Constitution).
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death penalty. By employing proportionality review, a court can ex-
amine a community's application of a statutory term to those fact situa-
tions which lie at the core of its application. When such applications are
neither excessive nor arbitrary, they are a guide to both community mo-
res and the appropriate meaning of a vague term.
129
e. Legal rulings on questionable applications of existing law. Even a nar-
rowly defined statutory aggravating circumstance may result in arbi-
trariness if its application in a particular case is unwarranted. For
example, a jury might convict and sentence a defendant to death for an
unintentional killing during the course of a felony. 130 In a non-capital
case, the felony-murder rule would permit a conviction. Nonetheless, to
impose a death sentence for such a killing is excessive. 131 Thus, the ordi-
nary rules of substantive criminal law may not adequately protect the
constitutional proscription of arbitrary capital sentences. Critical judi-
cial scrutiny is necessary.
f. Review forpassion, prejudice, or other arbitrarfactor. In a number of
states, reviewing courts are statutorily required to examine whether
death sentences have been imposed because of passion, prejudice, or
other arbitrary factors.1 3 2 While such factors would probably be noticed
by comparing a case with others, a single record might also reveal the
operation of arbitrary factors.
Such focused review might overturn death sentences where a sen-
tencer was unduly influenced by the bloodiness of a crime as opposed to
the depravity of the criminal. Suppose, for example, that defendant
killed his victim by shotgun blast and that the victim died instantly.
Compared to an instantaneous killing by poisoning or a single blow to
the temple, a shotgun killing is exceptionally gory, yet otherwise the kill-
ings are equivalent. 133 A jury could thus be prejudiced by the manner
of killing, lacking an objective appraisal of the killing itself.
If the legislature has provided that only specified statutory aggra-
vating circumstances will make an offense death-eligible, a sentencer's
consideration of non-statutory factors is improper. 134 A reviewing court
therefore must determine whether a sentencer was swayed by improper
129 See G0dfrq, 446 U.S. at 429-32.
130 Se Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
131 Enmund, 102 S. Ct. at 3378.
132 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537 (Supp. 1975); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-19-
101(5)(h)(Supp. 1982).
133 See Godfrq, 446 U.S. at 433; Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856, 268 S.E.2d 339 (1980); cf.
Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1263-64 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing the "heinous, atro-
cious, and cruel" aggravating factor); State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183 (1981);
State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979).
134 Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1979); Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1977);
Purdy v. State, 343 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1977).
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factors. For example, in a state in which a defendant's future danger to
society is not an aggravating factor, a prosecutor may interject an im-
proper consideration by suggesting that the defendant could be released
if not sentenced to death. 13 5 Jury fear of defendant's eventual release
might impel a death sentence. Similarly, the jury should not consider
the possibility that a sentence may be reviewed by a higher court and
corrected if wrong.
136
g. Independent review of the aggravating circumstances evidence. Some re-
viewing courts, rather than relying on trial court findings, conduct an
independent evaluation of the record to determine whether there is suffi-
cient support for a finding of an aggravating circumstance. 137 In ordi-
nary criminal appeals, a jury's assessment of facts will be upheld as long
as the jury could reasonably have found facts as it did. 138 Independent
review of the evidence means that the reviewing court, rather than de-
ferring to the jury verdict as conclusively settling the facts, makes its
own determination of the strength of factual support for the finding.
This double check on the quality and weight of evidence further ensures
principled capital sentencing.
h. Independent weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors. Follow-
ing an independent assessment of the evidence, a reviewing court may
determine whether mitigating factors are sufficient to require leniency.
If so, the court will conclude that, as a matter of law, no reasonable jury
could have returned a death sentence.
139
i. Reviewing a death sentence to determine whether it makes a measurable
contribution to deterrence or retribution. Excessive sentences may be detected
through proportionality review or individual case review.140 The review
may take the form of questioning the purpose that the death sentence
would have in a particular case. Suppose, for example, that a capital
defendant presents evidence of substantial mental impairment. Even if
the evidence serves neither as a defense to the crime nor as a mitigating
circumstance, a reviewing court could note the mental impairment and
conclude that defendant's execution would not serve any legitimate pur-
135 State v. Lindsey, 404 So. 2d 466 (La. 1981).
136 Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 240 S.E.2d 833 (1977); Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142, 240
S.E.2d 37 (1977); Prevatte v. State, 233 Ga. 929, 214 S.E.2d 365 (1975); State v. Jones, 296
N.C. 495, 251 S.E.2d 425 (1979); State v. Gilbert, 273 S.C. 690, 258 S.E.2d 890 (1979).
137 See, e.g., State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 659 P.2d 1, cerl. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2444 (1983);
Hobbs v. Arkansas, 277 Ark. 271, 641 S.W.2d 9 (1982); Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812 (Utah
1980).
138 See, e.g., B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 683, 685 (Supp. 1978).
139 See supra note 137 and infia note 141. The United States Supreme Court has noted that
determination of the acceptability of a death penalty is ultimately a judicial function. En-
mund, 102 S. Ct. at 3376; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
140 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text and infra notes 142-46 and accompanying
text.
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pose of punishment: persons with his degree of incapacity could not be
deterred by execution, and retribution against someone who may not
understand his own offense would be unwarranted.
14 1
j. Proportionality reviews. While proportionality review is a separate
technique developed to discover both excessive and arbitrary sentenc-
ing, it also facilitates the other forms of appellate capital sentence re-
view. Indeed, it is sometimes the interplay between proportionality
review and other appellate review techniques that enables a reviewing
court to discover improper capital sentencing. A comparison of the case
under review with other cases is always a useful exercise since it is the
only way to ensure consistency among cases.
There are three kinds of proportionality review: offense, intracase,
and intercase proportionality review.
1. Offenseproportionality review. Appellate courts have an obligation
to determine whether a death sentence is excessive for a given crime.
For example, some state death penalty statutes permit the imposition of
the death penalty for non-homicidal offenses such as rape or armed rob-
bery. 142 Such statutes exceed contemporary standards of decency re-
garding the imposition of death sentences,143 and only appellate review
can control their application.
2. Intracaseproportionality review. In some capital cases, multiple de-
fendants are charged with the same crimes based on the same evidence.
A prosecutor may then permit one or more defendants to plead guilty to
a non-capital charge while refusing the same bargain to a co-defendant.
If the non-pleading defendant is convicted and receives a death sen-
tence, a serious question of equal treatment may arise. When the evi-
dence shows that the pleading defendants are equally or more culpable
than the defendant going to capital trial, the disparate treatment is in-
defensible, unless leniency is legally warranted in exchange for a plea. 144
141 While this is a case-by-case determination, some courts have established general rules
regarding the significance of particular mitigating circumstances. For example, a defendant's
youth or mental impairment are particularly important mitigating circumstances. Some
courts have adopted a rebuttable presumption in favor of a life sentence for capitally con-
victedjuveniles and the mentally impaired. See State v. Valencia, 132 Ariz. 248, 645 P.2d 239
(1982); State v. Brookover, 124 Ariz. 38, 601 P.2d 1322 (1979); Jones v. State, 332 So. 2d 615
(Fla. 1976).
142 See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9.
143 See, e.g., Enmund, 102 S. Ct. at 3376; Coker, 433 U.S. at 599.
144 Fairness in sentencing between capital defendants who receive a capital sentence and
those who plea bargain and receive a lesser sentence is a major issue in capital sentencing law.
In Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978), a non-capital case, the Supreme Court
held that a state may constitutionally extend leniency in exchange for a guilty plea. In
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), the Court held that a defendant may not be
penalized for demanding a jury trial. Under the federal statute struck down in Jackson, a
death sentence could be imposed following a jury's recommendation, but not following a
1983]
812 GARY GOODPASTER [Vol. 74
Intracase disproportionality also occurs where two defendants are
tried either together or separately on the same charges and the same
bench trial. The Court held that this statutory structure "needlessly penalize[d] the assertion
of a constitutional right," and was therefore unconstitutional. Id at 583.
When two or more co-defendants have committed the same capital crime and are
equally culpable, it is not clear that one defendant's plea of guilty justifies leniency toward
him as a matter of law. Although a guilty plea may show remorse, it may also show a desire
to avoid the death penalty. Is it appropriate to let a capital defendant live simply because he
or she saved the state the time, trouble, and expense of trying the case? This is tantamount to
telling a capital defendant who chooses to go to trial that the real reason he will receive the
death sentence is the time, trouble, and expense he imposed on the state.
Since it is an executive function, courts rarely interfere with the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. A prosecutor may have good reasons, such as the quality of the proof or lesser
culpability, for offering a capital defendant a life sentence in exchange for a plea. This seems
unjustifiable, however, where a prosecutor could prove the equal culpability of co-defendants
at trial.
The real constitutional issue is not whether leniency can be accorded for a guilty plea in
general, but whether there is any constitutional check on a prosecutor's ability to do this. The
issue was abstractly raised and summarily dismissed in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199. There peti-
tioner argued that unfettered prosecutorial discretion to plea bargain in capital cases intro-
duced unconstitutional arbitrariness into the ultimate decision of whether a given capital
defendant would live or die. The Gregg plurality stated that a decision to afford a capital
defendant mercy did not violate the Constitution. It further noted that to rule otherwise, "it
would be necessary to require that prosecuting authorities charge a capital offense whenever
arguably there had been a capital murder and that they refuse to plea bargain with the
defendant." Id. at 199 n.50.
This position, while addressing the issue of arbitrariness, fails to recognize the equal
treatment issue. Justice White, in Gregg, treated the issue somewhat more forthrightly:
Petitioner's argument that prosecutors behave in a standardless fashion in deciding
which cases to try as capital felonies is unsupported by any facts. Petitioner simply asserts
that since prosecutors have the power not to charge capital felonies they will exercise that
power in a standardless fashion. This is untenable. Absent facts to the contrary, it can-
not be assumed that prosecutors will be motivated in their charging decision by factors
other than the strength of their case and the likelihood that a jury would impose the
death penalty if it convicts. Unless prosecutors are incompetent in their judgments, the
standards by which they decide whether to charge a capital felony will be the same as
those by which the jury will decide the questions of guilt and sentence. Thus defendants
will escape the death penalty through prosecutorial charging decisions only because the
offense is not sufficiently serious; or because the proof is insufficiently strong. This does
not cause the system to be standardless any more than the jury's decision to impose life
imprisonment on a defendant whose crime is deemed insufficiently serious or its decision
to acquit someone who is probably guilty but whose guilt is not established beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thus the prosecutor's charging decisions are unlikely to have removed
from the sample of cases considered by the Georgia Supreme Court any which are truly
"similar." If the cases really were "similar" in relevant respects, it is unlikely that prose-
cutors would fail to prosecute them as capital cases; and I am unwilling to assume the
contrary.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring). Justice White thus assumed that prosecutors
generally have a good reason for differential treatment of capital defendants. He leaves open
the possibility that a capital defendant's death sentence should be overturned when his co-
defendant was unjustifiably allowed to plead guilty and receive a lesser sentence. This is in
accord with the position taken by the American Bar Association: "Similarly situated defend-
ants should be afforded equal plea agreement opportunities." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY, § 14-3.1(c) (1982); accord State v.
Coleman, 185 Mont. 299, 371-72, 605 P.2d 1000, 1041 (1979)(Shea, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
448 U.S. 914 (1980).
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aggravating and mitigating evidence and one receives a death sentence
while the other does not. On occasion, even where the evidence respect-
ing the culpability of the separate defendants differs somewhat, an ap-
parently more culpable defendant receives a life sentence while a less
culpable defendant receives a death sentence. 145 If there is no princi-
pled distinction between same-crime defendants, a death sentence for
one is aberrant and should fall. 146
3. Intercase proportionality review. Capital sentencers must have un-
guided discretion to impose a life sentence rather than a death penalty
to insure that the sentences reflect changing standards of decency. It is
impossible to determine and apply contemporary mores regarding the
imposition of death sentences without systematic intercase proportional-
ity review. It is an essential means of ensuring principled capital sen-
tencing through the consistent application of contemporary mores.
States have developed the foregoing appellate review procedures to
detect unconstitutional capital sentencing. Each technique has, in prac-
tice, uncovered improper sentencing. The procedures overlap and the
different techniques might discover the same error. Techniques other
than proportionality review treat only the internal reliability of a death
sentence. Proportionality review, by contrast, provides an external check
that other forms of review cannot duplicate. Thus, while the Constitu-
tion might not demand that a jurisdiction adopt all of the described
internal review techniques, some combination of internal and external
review is essential to detect error.
C. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT OF RIGOROUS APPELLATE AND
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW OF CAPITAL SENTENCING
Capital sentences are constitutional only when imposed on the basis
of contemporary standards of decency. Due respect and fairness to indi-
viduals require that the death penalty be imposed consistently or not at
all.
There is a continued risk of arbitrariness in practice in capital sen-
tencing systems which are constitutional on their face. Only rigorous
appellate review and proportionality review can ensure that contempo-
rary standards are consistently applied and that similarly situated capi-
tal defendants are treated similarly.
145 See State v. Mcllvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. 1982).
146 Cf. Miller v. State, 415 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1982) (defendant given death sentence to
avoid disproportionality); Smith v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1982)(defendant
excused from death sentence to avoid disproportionality).
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IV. THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED DEATH
SENTENCE REVIEW
A. PROBLEMS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DEATH SENTENCES
Although current appellate review of capital sentencing has de-
tected some unprincipled death sentences, it has not been as effective as
it could be. 147 Most state review techniques are simply elaborations of
traditional criminal appeal review procedures. The problems associated
with traditional review are familiar: inconsistent application and insuf-
ficient rigor of application. Concurrently, trial courts fail to impose pro-
cedural devices that would facilitate accurate and intelligent judicial
review of capital sentences.14 8 These problems are correctable only with
strict adherence to explicit constitutional requirements.
Proportionality review occupies a special status among appellate
review procedures and presents special problems. It is the only review
technique which tests capital sentences against accumulated evidence of
contemporary mores. Important in its own right, it can also serve as a
cross-check on the effectiveness of other review techniques. However,
although it has similarities with common law use of case precedent,
149 it
is a new and unfamiliar review technique. Thus, courts have yet to de-
velop it into a truly effective instrument for reducing arbitrariness in
capital sentencing.
Problems in the use of proportionality review are both readily iden-
tifiable and correctable. The major problems are: (1) determination of
the relevant comparative pool of cases; (2) proper characterization of
cases as similar or dissimilar; and (3) consideration of all relevant
variables.
I. The relevant comparative pool of cases
A critical but unresolved question in proportionality review of capi-
tal sentences is the nature of the pool of cases to be used to detect exces-
siveness. The problem has two distinct levels. First, it is necessary to
establish the initial source or general pool of capital cases from which
cases may be chosen for comparison to the case under review. For exam-
ple, the general pool could be: all capitally charged cases, regardless of
sentence; all appealed capital cases; capital cases in which a death sen-
tence is returned; or other possible groupings.
Once this general pool is established, a smaller pool of cases, specifi-
cally selected because of similarity to the case under review, must be
147 See Dix, supra note 64, at 159; see also supra notes 135-50.
148 See Dix, supra note 64, at 159; see also supra notes 135-50.
149 Baldus, supra note 123.
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chosen for comparison. For example, if the case under review is a rob-
bery-murder, the specific comparative pool might be all robbery-murder
cases, or it might be all felony cases, or perhaps felony-murder cases
where the defendant had an intent to kill, and so on.
State court practices in choosing these two pools vary and are in-
consistent. For example, some courts may use all cases in which a de-
fendant is convicted of a crime which is capitally chargeable, whether
actually capitally charged or not. 150 Others use all appealed capital
cases in the state, regardless of sentence, as the general pool. 15 1 Still
others use only appealed cases from the same judicial district as the case
under review rather than a statewide pool. 152 Finally, some courts con-
sider only cases in which a death sentence was imposed.
153
Each method has important consequences for its ultimate use as a
data base for comparing sentences. For example, as all but one of the
foregoing pools comprise less than all capitally charged crimes in the
jurisdiction, each sample may be skewed. Examination of patterns of
treatment and sentencing in all capital-eligible cases is important in that
it allows courts to keep abreast of actual community sentiment and re-
vise capital sentences where they appear aberrant. All capital-eligible
cases would include plea-bargained cases and cases in which the trier of
fact found a capitally charged defendant guilty of a lesser included of-
fense. To include such cases allows jury and prosecutorial leniency in
similar cases to affect the propriety of a death sentence in a particular
case.
While such a pool would include all relevant cases, it is unclear
whether the Constitution requires it. In Gregg, the plurality expressly
rejected arguments that unfettered prosecutorial discretion to plea bar-
gain potential capital cases or jury discretion to return lesser-included
offense sentences violated the Constitution. The plurality in Gregg
stated:
At each of these [discretionary] stages an actor in the criminal justice sys-
tem makes a decision which may remove a defendant from consideration
as a candidate for the death penalty. Furman, in contrast, dealt with the
decision to impose the death sentence on a specific individual who had
been convicted of a capital offense. Nothing in any of our cases suggests
that the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Con-
stitution. Furman held only that, in order to minimize the risk that the
150 See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.130(b)(1981).
15t McCaskill v. State, 344 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1977); Ross v. State, 233 Ga. 361, 365, 211
S.E.2d 356, 359 (1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976).
152 Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982)(en banc); State v. Williams, 383 So.
2d 369 (La. 1980)(both cases rejecting arguments that state-wide review is constitutionally
required).
153 State v. Williams, 305 N.C. 656, 292 S.E.2d 243 (1982).
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death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected group of of-
fenders, the decision to impose it had to be guided by standards so that the
sentencing authority would focus on the particularized circumstances of
the crime and the defendant.
54
Gregg's focus on the sentencing authority's decisions suggests that
the constitutionally appropriate comparative capital pool is all cases in
which a sentencer actually decided whether to impose a death sen-
tence. 155 Any lesser pool would inadequately reflect sentencer sentiment
and would result in inaccurate principles of aggravation and mitigation.
Similarly, pools excluding cases in which a life sentence was imposed
preclude an informed consideration of whether equivalently circum-
stanced capital defendants were treated similarly.
In addition to determining the composition of the general pool, a
court must decide whether it may be geographically limited to a general
capital pool derived only from the same judicial district in which the
defendant was convicted. Essentially, the issue is whether the relevant
community mores for capital sentencing purposes means the state mores
or those of trial districts within the state.
Since a death sentence can be imposed for only principled reasons,
defined initially as statutory aggravating circumstances, the whole state
must be the relevant community. The people, speaking through their
legislators as representatives, have collectively defined the circumstances
under which a death sentence should be imposed at the state level. Stat-
utory aggravating circumstances, however, no matter how strictly de-
fined, allow considerable sentencer interpretation. Interpretations of
community values based upon decisions of a geographic capital pool
smaller than the whole state risk overvaluation of non-representative de-
cisions. Any significant disparity between state judicial districts in the
application of the death penalty will magnify any underlying arbitrari-
ness. Whether a defendant lives or dies might come to depend in large
measure upon where he was tried in the state. 156 Therefore, the only
justifiable general capital comparative pool is all state capital cases
where a sentencer made a choice whether to impose a capital sentence.
154 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (plurality opinion).
155 There are a number of unresolved constitutional issues relating to prosecutorial discre-
tion to plea bargain capital cases. Most important are those relating to fair treatment of co-
defendants or similarly situated defendants. This is an undeveloped area of law, and the
capital case demonstrating arbitrariness through prosecutorial discretion has yet to be made.
See supra note 144. But see Baldus, supra note 123, at 731.
Because the law regarding exercise of prosecutorial discretion in capital cases is so unde-
veloped, I have at present chosen to assert only that the smallest constitutionally mandated
comparative pool is all cases in which the sentencer has made a life or death decision. Should
it become possible to review prosecutorial discretion in capital cases, the larger pool, which
included such arbitrary cases, would appear to be constitutionally required.
156 See infra text accompanying notes 172-74.
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It is the only geographic pool that will automatically neutralize nonrep-
resentative and aberrant decisions.
2. Determining similarity
Although it is possible to define the appropriate composition of the
general pool, selection of the specific pool for comparison presents differ-
ent problems. One must first determine which cases are sufficiently sim-
ilar for comparative purposes and next determine a sentencer's reasons
for imposition or non-imposition of the death penalty.
a. Establishing relevant comparative characteristics. In reviewing a
death sentence, the relevant characteristics which establish the class of
similar cases are those of the case under review. It is difficult to deter-
mine which of countless case characteristics are relevant for comparative
purposes. There are no set procedures for this determination, and there
may be equally valid ways to describe the same case. Take, for example,
the following descriptions of the same case: (A) Victim died from loss of
blood after defendant stabbed her; (B) Victim, a fifteen year old girl,
died from loss of blood when defendant stabbed her repeatedly after
strangling and beating her. This simple example shows that the same
case can be described on different levels of generality or detail through
factual inclusion or deletion. Cases are not inherently similar or dissimi-
lar, but can be made to seem so by a careful selection of characteristics
said to be relevant.
b. Detemining reasons for the sentence. Determining similarity carries
with it the necessity of finding the principled basis for the sentence cho-
sen. If a capital sentencer hears aggravating and mitigating evidence
and returns a death sentence, it must be presumed that the aggravating
evidence outweighed the mitigating. If it returns a life sentence, the
reverse is true. In either situation, however, a reviewing court will not
know which circumstances the sentencer found to be present or why and
how the sentencer determined that the one set of circumstances out-
weighed the other. Even when the sentencer returns a death sentence
based upon the express finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance,
the specific reason for imposing a death sentence may be unclear since
an aggravating circumstance only allows a death sentence; it does not
necessitate one.
If the reviewing court cannot detect the reason for a sentence, it
cannot compare the case with others to see if the same reason was out-
come-determinative in those other cases. A court may have to scan the
record and attempt an informed guess regarding the reason for the sen-
tence. When the facts are complex and there is significant aggravating
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or mitigating evidence, a reviewing court's guess is merely specula-
tion.1 57 When this occurs, cases compared for review may be decision-
ally incomparable, and the reviewing court is comparing fictions of its
own making. Speculation undermines proportionality review.
c. Appellate review problem illustration. A case which illustrates both
the characterization and speculation problems of proportionality review
is Moore v. State. 158 Moore planned to rob Stapleton in his home. Moore
entered the home at night through a bedroom window. Although
Moore later said he had no intention to kill, he had a pistol with him in
case he encountered opposition. After Moore's entry, Stapleton sur-
prised Moore and fired a shotgun at him. Moore fired several shots in
response, two of which hit and killed Stapleton. Moore then took $5,700
he found on Stapleton. When subsequently arrested, he surrendered all
of the money and evidence in his possession and generally cooperated
with the police.
Moore pled guilty to capital charges before a judge. The judge
convicted him, specifically finding that Moore had committed "malice
murder, while in the commission of another capital crime, armed rob-
bery," a statutory aggravating factor under Georgia law. 159 In mitiga-
tion, the judge noted:
You, in my opinion, did everything that a man could do after you were
caught and do [sic] an honorable thing insofar as your true statements
made, your cooperation with officials, pleading guilty to the mercy of the
Court, and placing an awesome responsibility on me.
1 60
Nonetheless, the judge found that the aggravating circumstances out-
weighed the mitigating circumstances. He felt that armed robbery and
homicide in the victim's home was so serious that the offender should
automatically receive the death penalty. 61 In other words, the specific
reason for the imposition of the death sentence was that it was a killing,
during the course of an armed robbery, in the victim's home.
Because the trial judge specified his reason for imposing a death
157 The purpose of requiring a sentencing jury to provide written findings in support of
a death sentence is to enable appellate courts to ensure that the jury's discretion was
properly exercised and that the sentence was not arbitrary or capricious. In the absence
of such written findings, the reviewing court can only assume that the jury acted within
its instructions. While that assumption is commonly employed in reviewing general ver-
dicts of guilt, it is not a permissible basis for approval of a death sentence.
Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1982) (Canby, J., concurring), cert. granted, 103
S. Ct. 1425 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1983)(No. 82-1095).
158 233 Ga. 861, 213 S.E.2d 829 (1975),cer. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976), reh'g denied, 239 Ga.
67, 235 S.E.2d 519, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977), rev'dsub nom. Blake v. Zant, 513 F. Supp.
772, 803-18 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
159 Blake v. Zant, 513 F. Supp. at 810.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 811.
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sentence, the reviewing court in Moore was in a position to compare the
case with others having the same critical variables of a killing during an
armed robbery of the victim's home. If, as is usually the case, the trial
judge had not given his specific reason for imposing death, the reviewing
court would have had to guess the reason from the record. Yet an exam-
ination of the record discloses other facts which might also have been
determinative of penalty: the robbery was planned well in advance;
Moore carried a gun with him and therefore may have planned to kill;
Moore fired four or five shots; it was a killing during an armed robbery,
regardless of location.162 In the usual case, finding these factors in the
record, a reviewing court would simply have to assume which of them,
or which combination of them, were outcome-determinative. Incorrect
guesses would lead to improper selection of cases for comparison.
In conclusion, where the record does not clearly disclose the specific
basis for the sentence in a capital case, there is a significant risk that the
reviewing court will assign the wrong reason and therefore pick the
wrong set of cases for proportionality review. Principled and consistent
capital sentencing cannot then result.
Even with knowledge of the basis for the imposition of the sentence,
a reviewing court may misuse proportionality review in such a way as to
destroy its effectiveness as a review technique. In Moore, commission of
the homicide in the home was the known critical factor. It would be rea-
sonable to conclude that the specific pool of cases for comparison would
be those involving homicides during armed robberies of the victim's
home. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the death sentence
was not disproportionate in his case.163 However, in conducting its pro-
portionality review, the court considered twenty-three cases. Only three
of these twenty-three cases involved victims killed in their homes, and in
only one of the three was a death penalty returned.164 In the two cases
in which a life sentence was returned, the defendants, unlike Moore, had
prior felony convictions and each killed two victims in their homes. 165
The trial judge was therefore wrong when he opined that killing a vic-
tim in his home was so serious that it would automatically entail the
death penalty; 166 two juries had concluded otherwise. Since more cul-
pable offenders killing two victims in the home had received a life sen-
tence, it would follow that death may have been an inappropriate
sentence for Moore.
The Georgia Supreme Court's misuse of proportionality review in
162 id. at 803-04.
163 Id at 815.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 811.
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Moore shows how result-oriented such review can be. Twenty of the
cases it selected for similarity were dissimilar on the critical factor. In
the three cases that were similar, two did not support the conclusion
that death was an appropriate sentence. Proportionality review when
misused has no value as a check on rationality and consistency in sen-
tencing. For proportionality review to work properly, principled and
objective determinations must govern every step of the process.
3. Failure of appellate courts to consider all relevant
capital sentencing variables
Appellate courts seem to be failing to discover arbitrariness and dis-
crimination in the imposition of capital sentences because they do not
systematically look at all relevant variables.
67
The race of the victim is a particularly important variable. Killers
of whites are far more likely to receive a death sentence than killers of
blacks.' 68 Of these, black killers of whites are most likely to receive a
death sentence. 169 The data
reflect a twofold departure from even-handed justice which is consistent
with a single underlying racist tenet: that white lives are worth more than
black lives. From this tenet it follows that death as punishment is more
appropriate for the killers of whites than for the killers of blacks and more
appropriate for black than for white killers.'
70
The likelihood of an aggravating circumstance finding, which
death-qualifies the crime, is also greater for blacks who kill whites than
for any other grouping:
[T]he effect of race of victim among blacks convicted of first degree murder
far exceeds the impact of an accompanying felony charge. Indeed, among
blacks charged with an accompanying felony, virtually half were found to
have an aggravating felony circumstance by sentencing authorities if their
victims were white, while not one was found to have such an accompany-
ing circumstance if the victim were black.'
7'
Within any state, there may also be serious discrimination by place
of conviction. The chance of a death sentence for the same underlying
offense differs greatly between different regions of the same state. For
example, "[fqor felony-type murder in Florida, the death sentence in the
panhandle is four to five times more likely than in the southern and
167 Baldus, supra note 123; Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination under Post-
Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980).
168 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 167, at 593-601; see also Zeisel, Race Bias in he Administration
of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 HARV. L. REv. 456 (1981).
169 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 167, at 595.
170 Id at 601.
171 Id at 615.
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northern regions of the state .... 172 In Georgia, "[c]ourts in the
central, southwestern, and southeastern regions are three to four times
more likely to impose the death sentence for felony murder than those in
northern Georgia, and about eight times more likely to do so than those
in Fulton County [where Atlanta is located]."
173
Furthermore, the effects of differential imposition of the death sen-
tence in accordance with race or place, when taken together, produce
even more extreme disparities. "For [felony-murder] killings under sim-
ilar circumstances the death sentence is roughly thirty times more likely
for the killer of a white in the panhandle [of Florida] than for a killing of
a black in the northern region."
1 74
Finally, traditional appellate review of capital sentences, which is
supposedly a check on discrimination in sentencing, has "no tendency
. . . to correct the racial differences in treatment, whether at the sen-
tencing or the presentencing stages of the process."' 175 Traditional ap-
pellate review also does not correct and, indeed, may worsen, intra-state
regional disparities in the imposition of death sentences.
1 76
In conclusion, researchers have found that "race is truly a pervasive
influence on the criminal justice processing of potentially capital
cases. . . . And it is an influence that persists despite separate sentenc-
ing hearings, explicitly articulated sentencing guidelines, and automatic
appellate review of all death sentences."
177
While it may be impossible to eliminate completely the discrimina-
tory effects of race and place, appellate courts must demand principled
and nondiscriminatory sentences, and must vacate death penalties im-
posed for either reason.
172 Id. at 604.
173 Id at 605.
174 Id at 607.
175 Id at 622-23.
[The] flaws in the system of capital punishment may not often nor necessarily be evident
in the details of a specific case; they may only be exposed in the aggregate, over a
number of cases. The evidence. . . surely indicates that the appellate courts have failed
to meet their responsibility to remove strong and systematic extralegal influences on the
imposition of the death penalty.
Id at 625. Much of the racial disparity in capital sentencing is explainable by deep and
perhaps unconscious racial attitudes and fears:
[P]eople will be more shocked and outraged by crimes that victimize members of the
dominant racial group, by crimes that are perpetrated by members of the . . .
subordinated racial group, and especially by killings in which a minority group offender
crosses racial boundaries to murder a majority group victim.
Id at 630-3 1.
176 Id at 623-25.
177 Id. at 616.
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D. IMPROVING THE ABILITY OF APPELLATE COURTS TO DETECT
ARBITRARINESS IN CAPITAL SENTENCING
To resolve proportionality review problems of characterization, un-
certainty, and failure to consider all relevant variables, one may rely on:
(1) the courts, newly informed of the problems, to use more care and
rigor in their reviews; (2) quantitative methods; (3) corrective proce-
dural mechanisms, such as requiring a sentencer statement of reasons for
a sentence, standardized statements of salient features of all capital cases
made a public record, or an appellate adversarial hearing on issues of
"similarity," "dissimilarity," and excessiveness.
Of these alternatives, reliance on courts, regardless of their integ-
rity, seems the least satisfactory solution. Appellate review of capital
sentencing has been demonstrably deficient.' 78 Courts have been highly
subjective in their case characterizations, 179 and have resisted efforts to
objectify the case comparison process. 180 Further, no amount of care in
appellate review will solve the uncertainty problem. Only a change in
procedural requirements, imposing an obligation on the sentencer to
give reasons for its sentence, can solve it. 181
Existing quantitative methods offer more promise. Data for each
capital case can be collected on all significant factors. Through statisti-
cal analysis of the cases, one can determine which factors, or which com-
bination of factors, appear to explain the verdicts.18 2 Combined with
qualitative review, quantitative methods would greatly assist a review-
ing court in focusing on significant sentencing factors. 183 The specific
reason for a particular sentence would still not be known definitively,
but would be effectively "triangulated."' 8 4 In addition, an apparent and
possibly improper reason such as race or place of conviction would be
discovered by a reviewing court and sentences based on such factors
could be overturned.
Quantitative methods would help to reduce arbitrariness and iden-
178 Baldus, supra note 123; Bowers & Pierce, supra note 167, at 625, Dix; supra note 64, at
159.
179 Id.; see also Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 1982); Blake v.
Zant, 513 F.Supp. 772, 815-18 (S.D. Ga. 1981); State v. Newlon, 627 S.W.2d 606, 628, 633
(Mo. 1982) (Seiler, J., concurring in part); Coleman v. State, - Mont. -, -, 633 P.2d 624,
663 (198 1) (Shea, J., dissenting).
180 See, e.g., Smith v. Balkcom, 671 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1982); Spinkellink v. Wainwright,
578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978); Thomas v. State, 421 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1982); Gall v. Common-
wealth, 607 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. 1980); Exparle Farley, 570 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1978).
181 Some states require such an obligation. See, e.g., State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla.
1973); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(b)(Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c) (Supp. 1981).
But see State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 283 S.E.2d 732 (1981).
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tify excessiveness in capital sentencing. Such techniques are commonly
used in jury selection, employment, gender discrimination, and other
cases, 185 and have been devised for capital cases as well.'8 6 No court,
however, appears to have adopted them for use in capital cases.187 This
is in part because the constitutional status of capital appellate review is
unclear. Further, a system of standardized data collection and com-
puter based statistical analysis might seem burdensome to a court inex-
perienced with such systems. Nonetheless, if the United States Supreme
Court holds, as its prior cases suggest it should, that some form of capital
proportionality review is constitutionally required, quantitative meth-
ods offer an effective means of conducting such review.
Some states, such as California, 8 8 conduct complex reviews of non-
capital sentences in order "to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing."' 89 The California Board of Prison
Terms compares the facts of each case, defendants' backgrounds, and
other relevant information. Then, through detailed statistical analysis,
the Board identifies typical sentencing patterns and cases varying from
those patterns. 90 Once the Board determines that a case is disparate, it
185 See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,329-30 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 302-13 (1977); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 336-43 (1977); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 485-92 (1977); Ar-
lington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268-71 (1977); Mayor of
Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 610-12, 619-21 (1974); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 11-15 (1973); Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625, 626-32 (1972); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249-51 (1972); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971); see also Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
186 Baldus, Pulaski, Woolworth & Kyle, supra note 46, at 1; Baldus, supra note 123. See
generally D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980).
187 See, e.g., Smith v. Balkcom, 671 F.2d 858, 859 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 181
(1982); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 612-16 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
976 (1979); Pickens v. Lockhart, 542 F. Supp. 585, 608-09 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Ross v. Hopper,
538 F. Supp. 105, 107 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Mitchell v. Hopper, 538 F. Supp. 77, 90-91 (S.D. Ga.
1982); McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 431, 434 (N.D. Ga. 1981)(all cases rejecting
statistical data).
188 "In all cases the Board of Prison Terms shall, not later than one year after the com-
mencement of the term of imprisonment, review the sentence and shall by motion recom-
mend that the court recall the sentence. . . and resentence the defendant . . . if the Board
determines the sentence is disparate." CAL. PEN. CODE § I 170()(Supp. 1982); see also Cassou
& Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California, The New Numbers Game, 9 PAC. L.J. 5, 56 (1978).
189 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1170()(Supp. 1982).
190 The following is the California Board of Prison Terms' own description of its proce-
dures in disparate sentence review:
The Board obtains information on individual cases from documents prepared dur-
ing the course of the judicial process: the Abstract of Judgment; the charging document;
the probation officer's report; the transcript of the proceedings at the time of sentencing;
and the CI report ('rap sheet'). Board analysts trained to read and interpret informa-
tion from these sources read these documents to collect over 150 pieces of information on
the case, including extensive information regarding the prisoner's adult and juvenile
criminal histories, social and demographic history, and the nature and extent of the pris-
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refers the case back to the sentencing court so that it may determine
whether the sentence is truly disparate and whether the sentence should
be recalled. 9 1 The California practice demonstrates the feasibility of
quantitative methods as a technique to ensure sentence uniformity. If a
state can do this for its non-capital cases, similar analyses are feasible for
a state's far more limited number of capital cases.
A less sophisticated and perhaps more familiar solution is to man-
date procedural rules for capital judgments and for determination of
which cases to use for comparative purposes. Corrective procedural
mechanisms appear to be a good practical solution to the problems of
uncertainty and characterization. If sentencers had to state their reason-
ing, the reviewing court would know exactly why defendant received the
sentence he or she received.
Knowing the reason for a given sentence helps to resolve the char-
acterization problem, but does not do so completely, as disclosed by the
Moore case discussed above.'9 2 In addition, even the similarity of stated
reasons may not be readily apparent and it may be necessary to weigh
reasons against each other to determine their similarity or dissimilarity.
Thus, even when the reasons for given sentences are provided, charac-
terization cannot be wrung from the system.
Fortunately, evaluating cases for their similarities and dissimilari-
oner's participation in the criminal activity resulting in the DSL commitment to state
prison.
The Board utilizes an automated screening procedure to sort cases by principal con-
victed offense, to identify the range of possible sentences for a particular offense group,
and to compute the relative likelihood that each of the possible sentences will occur. The
result of this process is called a sentence distribution and is derived from observed sen-
tencing practices in DSL cases received in prison between July 1, 1977 and January 31,
1981, and previously reviewed by the Board .... The Board uses the automated sen-
tence review only to identify cases for further scrutiny by Board staff.
The automated screening procedure employs a computer simulation technique
which uses the facts of each case to produce 10,000 theoretical sentencings for that case.
If, according to this simulation technique, fewer than 10.5% of those repeated sentenc-
ings would have resulted in a sentence as high as or higher or as low as or lower than the
actual sentence imposed in the case, the case is identified as requiring further review.
Cases identified for further scrutiny by the automated screening procedure are re-
ferred to the Sentence Review Unit for further review as "variant" cases. A "variant"
case is one whose sentence differs from that of other comparable cases. The Sentence
Review Unit reviews pertinent documents from the case file, examines closely important
facts of the case and important components of the sentence structure, and compares the
individual case with other similar cases. If the Sentence Review Unit believes the case to
be disparate after this review, it prepares a detailed analysis of the case ... for presenta-
tion to a Board panel of two members and one hearing representative. The determina-
tion that a case is disparate and should be referred to the sentencing court results from
the exercise of this panel's discretion.
California Board of Prison Terms Memorandum, filed in People v. Rivera, 141 Cal. App. 3d
1001, 192 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1983), in support of a Board motion to recall a prisoner's sentence.
191 People v. Herrera, 127 Cal. App. 3d 590, 601, 179 Cal. Rptr. 694, 700 (1982).
192 See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
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ties is exactly what lawyers and judges do all the time. However, the
same cases can be construed in quite different ways. Therefore, the pro-
cess of determining the legal meaning of case law is an adversary pro-
cess. There is nothing about the nature of the decisions made under
proportionality review which makes it less suitable than other legal deci-
sions for adversary resolution. The characterization problem can thus
be solved by appellate adversary proceedings concerning which cases
should serve as the specific comparative pool for the case under review.
In order for this system to work, advocates for the appellant and the
state must have access to detailed case summaries of all cases in the gen-
eral pool. Thus, systematic data collection and retrieval would be a nec-
essary component of the system.
193
Either of the methods detailed-statistical analysis or mandated
procedural changes in capital sentencing-or a combination of them
would make proportionality review a more effective check on arbitrari-
ness in capital sentencing. The Constitution requires capital sentencing
systems that reduce the risk of arbitrariness. An effective system of pro-
portionality review would contribute significantly to that end. The
Constitution seems to require effective proportionality review of capital
sentences. Such an interpretation would permit the states latitude to
adopt the best of the described methods, or to combine them.
V. CONCLUSION
Capital sentencing continues to be arbitrary in constitutionally ob-
jectionable ways. Rigorous techniques of appellate and proportionality
review, which are implied by constitutional principles regarding the im-
position of death sentences, can reduce this arbitrariness. Proportional-
ity review also ensures that capital sentencing will reflect current
community mores regarding the death sentence and helps to guarantee
equal protection for capital defendants. For these reasons, the United
States Supreme Court should hold that rigorous appellate review, and
in particular, proportionality review are constitutionally required.
Those who assert that rigorous appellate and proportionality re-
view are not constitutionally required must claim either that there is no
arbitrariness in state court decisions or that an arbitrary imposition of
death is proper. They must say that although the Constitution requires
capital sentencing systems which minimize the risk of arbitrariness, it
does not also require effective means which ensure that minimization.
193 Unfortunately, courts have resisted disclosing summaries of general pool cases as well as
their methods of choosing cases to compare with the case under review. See, e.g., Brown v.
Wainwright, 392 S.2d 1327 (Fla. 1981); Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. 1980);
Erpare Farley, 570 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1978).
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They must argue that those capitally convicted felons who now live be-
cause a state supreme court determined that their sentences were im-
posed arbitrarily should have died anyway, and that defendants
similarly sentenced in the future should die. If this is what the Constitu-
tion permits, there can be no guarantee of principled, consistent, and
just imposition of death sentences.
